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**REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT: OVER-OPTIMIZING AND  
ARSOF CAPABILITY**

BY

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## ABSTRACT

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The present National Military Strategy establishes the military's role of Shaping, Preparing, and Responding in support of US interests outlined in the National Security Strategy. The defense strategy calls for a selectively engaged military positioned to prevent the spread of violence, deter threats, and fight and win should deterrence fail. The challenge for the military is to meet these near term requirements while transforming combat capabilities to meet future, uncertain challenges.

The Regional Engagement concept is an Army Special Operations model that addresses ARSOF's relevancy for the future. This paper critiques the concept by reviewing the evolution of Peacetime Engagement (the basis for the concept), the Theater Engagement Plan, and numerous future documents. The paper finds the suggested force structure for the Regional Engagement Force problematic and concludes with recommendations for future ARSOF initiatives.



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## **REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT: OVER-OPTIMIZING AN ARSOF CAPABILITY**

With the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself in the unique position as the world's sole world power. Throughout the intervening decade, the US has struggled to define the appropriate security policy in relation to the uncertainty of this "New World Order". The certainty of the bipolar world, with the US, NATO, and other allies pitted against the USSR, Warsaw Pact, and their allies, gave way to a world marked by ambiguity. Proposals regarding the US stance ranged from neo-isolationism to global engagement or some variant in between.<sup>1</sup>

Post-Cold War operations from major deployments of US forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Southwest Asia, Africa, Panama and Haiti to military support to domestic authorities for disaster relief and the War against Drugs, punctuated the full spectrum of national security requirements facing all elements of national power.<sup>2</sup> The latest National Security Strategy outlines the policy of advancing the US national interests by Shaping the International Environment, Responding to Threats and Crises, and Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future.<sup>3</sup>

The resulting National Military Strategy presented the military's role in Shaping, Responding, and Preparing. The essence of the defense strategy calls for a selectively engaged force postured to prevent the spread of global and regional

threats, deterrence of threats against the US and its interests, and to fight and win should prevention and deterrence fail. A fourth aspect to the strategy requires the military to support domestic authorities when necessary. The challenge for the military is to meet the requirements to shape and respond in the near term, while at the same time transforming US combat capabilities and support structures to be able to shape and respond effectively in the face of future challenges.<sup>4</sup>

Numerous military documents and processes address the future environment and requirements. Each provides the common direction for the combatant commands, services, and related defense agencies as they address the capabilities-based force required in the future. Included among these are the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010), and the Army process, Army After Next (AAN). They serve as a guide for the development and assessment of future doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and people (DTLOM-P).<sup>5</sup>

In addition to the Defense and Service futures-related processes, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has initiated integrated and concurrent analyses for Special Operations Forces (SOF). USSOCOM, having congressionally assigned tasks similar to the Services,

developed SOF Vision 2020, which captures the concepts of Joint Vision 2010 and carries them forward to integrate SOF activities and capabilities with the Services and their larger conventional forces.<sup>6</sup> This template for developing future operational capabilities has enabled USSOCOM's components to pursue concepts unique to each and relevant to integration requirements not only with other SOF components but with conventional forces as well.

One such search for relevance is a concept for Army SOF (ARSOF) future theater military operations initiated within the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Regional Engagement.<sup>7</sup>

Regional Engagement is a concept derived from the understanding that although the central mission of the United States Armed Forces is war-fighting, there is recognition of the importance in the military role during the conduct of operations other than war. Regional Engagement is defined as "regionally oriented military information-gathering activities and proactive measures taken to influence international conditions to protect or advance United States national interests abroad".<sup>8</sup> Under the rubric of Peacetime Engagement and the overarching concept in the National Security Strategy, "The Imperative of Engagement," Regional Engagement has two conditions that underlie it. First, operations other than war will become more important in meeting future threats and second, these operations present unique

challenges and require special training and capabilities.<sup>9</sup> These conditions lead to a requirement for a force comprised of a core group of engagement professionals and structures with SOF-like characteristics and capabilities.<sup>10</sup> The structural framework for the REF is a standing joint task force headquarters, assigned to a regional CINC, with the mission of continuously planning and executing the region's engagement activities.

This research paper will provide a critique of the Regional Engagement Force or REF concept. Following an historical review of Peacetime Engagement, the research reviews the present system of directing, implementing, managing, and executing a regional CINC's theater engagement program. Additionally, it will incorporate a review of policy and strategy directives and guidance, futures documents, and scholarly writings in the critique of the REF concept.

With the research providing the background, the validity of the REF's conceptual construct is clear in that SOF and specifically ARSOF maintain the critical capabilities needed to execute Regional Engagement activities. However, the establishment of an additional headquarters within a combatant command is not feasible for a number of reasons. First, anticipated force structures and budgetary trends will not support it. Second, the entire theater staff must be involved in engagement activities as these tasks represent the

preponderance of missions on a daily basis. Third, establishing a headquarters optimized to plan and conduct engagement activities distinct from war-fighting activities is counter to the requirement that forces must be capable of operating throughout the operational spectrum, inhibits the integration of war-fighting and engagement activities, and violates the principle of Unity of Effort. Finally, with the high degree of uncertainty in the world security situation today one cannot guarantee that the national strategy will not change. Recent history has shown that while national interests remain relatively constant, the strategy to ensure those interests has changed.

#### PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

The concept of Peacetime Engagement as policy has its roots with the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Cold War. With its origins, came the diligent efforts, as well as the debates, of civilian and military members, in and outside of the Defense Department, to develop the enabling strategy defining the military role and how to manage the complexities of participating in such activities. Peacetime Engagement entered the lexicon of official US policy in 1990, in an address by President Bush in Aspen, CO, stating:<sup>11</sup>

"What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing without

neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of Peacetime Engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and cold war...Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made great gains, threats remain. Terrorism, hostage taking, renegade regimes and unpredictable rulers, new sources of instability-all require a strong and engaged America."

Secretary of Defense Cheney further expanded the definition a year later in his annual report to the President and congress.<sup>12</sup>

Peacetime Engagement is a strategy that seeks to counteract violence and to promote nation building. Military forces can be employed...to counter violence associated with threats such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, subversion, and insurgencies and, when necessary, to aid democratic freedom fighters. Peacetime Engagement also includes security assistance for unconventional warfare and FID. Regional conflict has replaced global war as the major focus of defense planning. Forces must be able to support forward presence, versatile conventional forces for Peacetime Engagement, crisis response and regional conflicts...

As presented for the first time in this official document, at least one aspect of Peacetime Engagement has changed over the years. Secretary Cheney's discussion maintains strong overtones of fighting "repressive regimes" and "insurgencies" with missions of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense, (two of the five core Special Forces missions). This reflects the perceived nature of Peacetime Engagement as a concept sitting solely in the realm of low-intensity conflict. Thus,

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict was the executive agent for the Peacetime Engagement effort. This association with special operations missions can explain in part, the difficulty the conventional forces had while addressing their role in these efforts. The other fundamentals of Peacetime Engagement, the potential use of all elements of national power, the objectives, and the focus on regional versus global aspects for defense planning remain the foundations for the present security policy.

Today, the policy of Peacetime Engagement is presented in, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997.

Although Peacetime Engagement is not cited in the document, the essence of the concept is captured in the section, "The Imperative of Engagement."<sup>13</sup> Key among these imperatives is the preparedness and willingness "to use all appropriate instruments of national power" and the capability "to exert global leadership and remain the preferred security partner for the community of states..."

The success of the strategy rests on the US ability to continue significant international leadership by shaping the international environment, responding to crises, and preparing for the future. The military role in this strategy includes building coalitions, forward stationing or deployment of forces, defense cooperation and security assistance, training and

exercises with allies and friends, with deterrence of aggression and coercion on a daily basis being another crucial aspect.<sup>14</sup>

The Security Strategy indicates the US willingness or more accurately, the necessity to engage throughout the world in order to maintain its position of "global leadership." This "nod to primacy"<sup>15</sup> and the fact that US security interests are bound to the concept of peacetime global engagement, indicate seemingly endless and unforeseeable requirements in which all elements of power must engage. This presents the military with a variety of challenges.

The '97 National Military Strategy defines military Peacetime Engagement as:

Encompassing all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. Engagement is a strategic function of all Armed Forces but it is a particularly important task of our forces overseas--and those rotationally or temporarily deployed. Serves to demonstrate our commitment; improve interoperability; reassure allies, friends and coalition partners; promote transparency; convey democratic ideals; deter aggression; and help relieve sources of instability before they can become military crises.<sup>16</sup>

The changes from the 1990 definition indicate not only the evolution of the term Peacetime Engagement, but also the defense community's understanding of the efficacy of noncombatant use of the military to project US influence. The military, having the force structure to do so, had always participated in these activities during the Cold War with Security Assistance,

training in conjunction with Foreign Military Sales, Humanitarian Assistance, combined exercises, and similar activities. But the services minimized these nonstandard programs and criticized them for diverting resources and undermining force readiness.<sup>17</sup> The ability to defeat the Soviet Union remained the focus of all military efforts.

The end of the Cold War brought certain realities such as, the elimination of our primary communist threat, US force reductions, and pressures to decrease defense spending. The resultant changes in the mission and roles of the military included a shift of the purpose of overseas engagement from protecting allies from communist invasion to strengthening partnerships with traditional allies and assisting transitions states to join these alliances. The primary mission of US forces moved from deterrence to shaping a world in the midst of change, where the concept of aligning forces against a predictable symmetric threat is for the most part insufficient. With limits placed on assets and resources, it becomes too prohibitive to maintain a force capable of addressing all potential contingencies, even if we could pinpoint them in this fluid environment. Arising from these realities was the recognition of using the military element of national power to shape the environment through engagement and thereby attaining a situation where combatant use of the military would be less

likely.<sup>18</sup> This challenges the Defense Department to not only maintain forces with the capability to protect US interests with force, but also to deploy its assets to support the National Security Strategy's goals for security, economic prosperity, and democratic growth. These goals do not translate into classical defense concepts and clearly defined military objectives.<sup>19</sup>

One of the key challenges the military faces is the continued draw-down of personnel while increasing the number of missions in which it is required to participate. With the end of the Cold War, the reduction in force structure has been approximately 40 percent while the use of that reduced force increased 300 percent.<sup>20</sup> In light of this neck-breaking pace where units are continually deployed with little training time in between, the search for criteria for selecting the military over, or in conjunction with, other elements of national power for Peacetime Engagements seems a prudent measure.

Peacetime Engagement operations have steadily evolved through the years since the end of the Cold War, both in our understanding and management of resources engaged in these missions. Although the US military conducted non-traditional engagement operations during the Cold War years, they are now becoming traditional and are dominant claimants on military resources.<sup>21</sup> The new policies, doctrine, and organization

required as a result represent the challenges for the policy makers in the next decade.

#### REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMAND THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLAN (TEP)

The FY 98 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan<sup>22</sup> tasks the geographic CINCs to produce an annual TEP which outlines the theater strategy and execution of engagement activities and covers a five-year period. The United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) TEP is a blueprint of the command's strategy to achieve US goals and objectives through engagement activities.<sup>23</sup> The TEP is developed by the J5 through the Theater Strategy Working Group. The development and implementation of the TEP requires the efforts and coordination of the entire staff, components, the interagency, Ambassadors and their country teams, NGO/PVOs, and other governmental agencies due to the magnitude of activities required.

The USCENTCOM TEP is comprised of two parts, the Strategic Concept and Engagement Activities. The Strategic concept describes the regional interests and threats and includes the goals and objectives. USCENTCOM divides the theater into four sub-regions in order to recognize their distinct differences and to focus staff and component efforts to identify areas of mutual cooperation and leverage engagement with key states in each region.<sup>24</sup> As is the case with other theater commands, the scope

of USCENTCOM's engagement strategy is expanding. This is due to the changing theater environment whereby the threat of full-scale war is becoming less likely. One should not read this to mean the use of military force has become unlikely but rather, it will be limited in its application. This assessment has allowed USCENTCOM to reallocate resources shifting some assets toward engagement while maintaining an adequate deterrent or war-fighting force.<sup>25</sup> Another aspect is the evolution of conventional thought in relation to engagement activities. That is, the awareness of cultural differences between both the US and countries in the region and between countries within the region. "In general, Americans lack an understanding of the region's distinct history and culture and are therefore apt to be insensitive to the unintentional threat their presence creates. These differences require special attention and awareness on the part of USCENTCOM."<sup>26</sup>

The number of engagement activities in USCENTCOM, as with other theaters, is extensive. Operational activities are the largest part of the program and include routine and continuing operations that are distinct from crisis response or those of an emergent nature. They include peace operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, counter-drug operations, sanctions enforcement, and force protection operations.<sup>27</sup> Combined exercises are another key part of the engagement strategy.

These include small unit exercises such as Special Operations Forces Joint/Combines Exercise Training (JCET) activities and exercises through Command Post Exercises to multinational exercises. Other foreign military interaction includes combined education activities, mil-to-mil contacts at all levels, humanitarian demining, host nation (HN) support and pre-positioning (PREPO), and Security Assistance.<sup>28</sup>

A final section of the plan addresses the resources available for engagement. As is the case throughout the military, resources within USCENTCOM are increasingly constrained. Although all requests for engagement activities cannot be fully accomplished, USCENTCOM has adequate resources to fulfill the current level of engagement and limited deterrence operations. Crisis response or other emergent contingency operations will require additional forces.<sup>29</sup> The plan closes by highlighting the need to balance war-fighting and engagement activities. As complementing activities, the integration of command resources and programs, both internal and external, is key and flexibility must be present to implement new war-fighting concepts and new engagement opportunities.<sup>30</sup>

#### THE REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT FORCE

With this backdrop of information about future military trends, the evolution of military participation in Peacetime

Engagement, and how the regional CINC conducts his engagement program one can look closer and evaluate aspects of the REF concept to determine its value added or relevancy to the CINCs' efforts.

The authors of the concept regard Regional Engagement as a radical shift in how the military approaches non-warfighting tasks.<sup>31</sup> In combination with warfighting and homeland defense, Regional Engagement represents a holistic approach to military operations and applies traditional warfighting Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) components. Regional Engagement provides a proactive means of conducting preventive defense and recognizes that engagement operations are not a lesser-included subset of warfighting. Finally, Regional Engagement activities can and at times must occur concurrently with smaller scale contingencies and major theater war.

Regional Engagement operations comprise three mutually supporting functions of situational awareness, war avoidance, and battlespace preparation. These functions are performed by military professionals assigned the roles of global scouts, strategic shapers, and operational combat outposts. The global scout provides a military HUMINT capability that provides ground truth with sensitivity to military-related nuances of situations, attitudes, and conditions. Strategic shapers integrate military capability into the national effort of

shaping the environment making it favorable to US interests.

Should war avoidance fail, the operational combat outpost can exert influence or deterrent capability through its forward presence as well as preparing for the arrival of combat forces.<sup>32</sup>

In order to plan and conduct the functions, the authors propose that the REF be a task-organized standing joint headquarters assigned to each geographic CINC. It is organized around core Regional Engagement professionals who plan, control, and execute the Regional Engagement plan.<sup>33</sup> To meet the required profile of the core professionals, the commander and key staff elements would come from the theater Special Operations Command (SOC), the subunified command that serves as the theater CINCs functional special operations component. The SOC provides this nucleus and exercises OPCON of the REF. Additionally, psychological operations and civil affairs forces would be provided. The headquarters would command and control designated forces with assigned or attached supporting assets. This command authority would extend to operations to include combat contingencies requiring less than an Army Corps headquarters (that is, employment of maneuver units of less than divisional size).<sup>34</sup>

The REF could form subordinate JTFs as required and would not deploy forward from its garrison location (normally collocated with the headquarters of the geographic CINC).

Service components are attached to the REF on a mission basis and appropriate forces apportioned to the geographic CINC would be directed to develop a habitual relationship with the REF. Although mission dependent, supporting forces from the Army conventional force structure could include, aviation, infantry, engineer, medical, services and transportation, military police, signal, and intelligence. ARSOF would constitute the bulk of the core Regional Engagement forces as well as provide core Regional Engagement professionals since they are regionally oriented and tasked with primary missions and collateral activities that prepare them for Regional Engagement.<sup>35</sup>

As stated in the introduction, ARSOF are ideally suited to both conduct and as required, provide C2 of conventional forces conducting Regional Engagement activities. The concept relates a response from General Reimer, the Chief of Staff of the Army, to a question during a pre-command course as to the future of ARSOF. "To me, small ARSOF units possessing the unique skills they possess could serve as the nucleus of a C2 element for Army After Next. They could well be the Army element of a standing joint task force and could serve as a command and control platform upon which we could hang capabilities we need."<sup>36</sup> There are however, other aspects of the concept that need review and revision.

Establishing the REF as a standing joint task force is problematic for a number of reasons. In a 1993 article, LTG Chelberg, former USEUCOM Chief of Staff, discusses the various approaches to establishing JTFs.<sup>37</sup> Even though LTG Chelberg relates the EUCOM experience, it has relevance to all theater CINC headquarters. Standing JTFs provide the advantages of being able to train and build in the jointness required as well as building cohesion. However, USEUCOM found that the manning requirements were too demanding in an era of declining personnel strength. Additionally, the vast scope of the theater, the broad range of potential missions, and the temptation for the remainder of the EUCOM staff to count on the JTF to handle all requirements made the standing JTF option a poor one.<sup>38</sup> A review of the USCENTCOM TEP clearly shows the myriad of engagement tasks and activities that require the efforts of the entire theater staff and are beyond the capabilities of a standing subordinate headquarters.

The nature of the EUCOM Theater precludes the use of standing JTFs as crises frequently develop in multiple locations, simultaneously, and normally last longer than forecasted. To meet the demands of concurrent crises, EUCOM would have to stand up several JTFs and the costs would increase beyond their resources.<sup>39</sup> These resources include personnel strengths and defense budgets. If the past is an indication,

one can anticipate both to either remain constant or decrease with the latter being the more likely. The end of the Cold War brought drastic reductions in both force structure and budget. From 1989-1998 the defense budget declined from 6 percent to 3 percent of GDP or a decrease from 24 percent to 15 percent of outlays.<sup>40</sup> The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997 outlines the strategy for the future in JV 2010 and calls for balancing requirements of the present and future and modernization of the force by embracing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).<sup>41</sup> To reach these goals, the QDR decisions required the reduction in personnel end strength in order to have the necessary funds. The reductions beginning in 1989 included, 36 percent, 29 percent, and 42 percent for active, reserve, and civilian strengths respectively.<sup>42</sup> In view of these facts, the establishment of additional headquarters would not appear feasible.

Maintaining a standing headquarters to plan and conduct only Regional Engagement activities is an over-optimization of military capability that addresses only part of the spectrum of military operations.<sup>43</sup> The present security strategy requires a force with multiple capabilities to shape, prepare, and respond. The challenge for defense is how to adjust doctrine and force structure to a new strategic environment dominated by small scale contingencies and Military Operations Other Than War

(MOOTW), while at the same time continuing to maintain military supremacy necessary to deter and defeat major aggression against US interests.<sup>44</sup> The paradox, asymmetry, and uncertainty, which define the present and future security environment, argue for a flexible military force, not an optimized one. Utility with respect to the full spectrum of national security objectives should be the governing principle in determining the structure of the US armed forces.<sup>45</sup>

Having the Regional Engagement headquarters distinct from the warfighting structure violates the principle of unity of effort. Warfighting and engagement are complementing activities that must be kept in balance and integrated. Handling these as two separate functions inhibits the required integration of the CINCs' finite resources and programs. This requirement was highlighted in the USCENTCOM TEP as essential to success.

A final concern with the REF concept is that it calls for significant changes in most areas of DTLOMS to address a national security strategy that may change. As indicated in many documents cited, the present and future security environment is described as uncertain, ambiguous, and rapidly changing. In his 1997 annual report the SECDEF describes the pace of change. "Even as our security picture evolves, the world is undergoing unprecedeted economic, political, and technological change - a pace that is sometimes breathtaking."<sup>46</sup>

This pace of change in the nature of the strategic environment could cause possible shifts in the National Security Strategy in order to guarantee national interests in light of changing threats and opportunities.<sup>47</sup> Additionally, an assumption of a continuous national strategy is a false conclusion based upon recent historical experience. During the Cold War, the strategy was Containment, post-Cold War-Engagement and Enlargement, and presently-Engagement. This reality of shifting policy priorities concomitant with the dynamic security environment discourages the application of significant assets to a strategy that may be short-lived.

## **CONCLUSION**

Regional Engagement represents a progressive military concept as a means to address the current National Security Strategy of Shaping, Responding, and Preparing. As with the evolution of conventional military thinking regarding the efficacy of Peacetime Engagement, Regional Engagement provides a degree of relevancy to Army Special Operations Forces as they look to the future. ARSOF are ideally suited to accomplish Regional Engagement due to their core competencies and individual qualifications. This is however, just one capability that ARSOF bring to the regional CINCs and it is critical to remember that ARSOF are first and foremost-warfighters. SOF

have been successful in a full range of engagement activities and operations other than war due to the training conducted for combat. The REF structure is not viable for the reasons stated in this paper. It represents an over-optimization of capability, is insupportable with present and projected resources, and calls for major changes to support a security strategy founded on uncertainty and rapid change.

The SOF community, to include ARSOF, should build upon present structures and capabilities in the search for future relevance. SOF brings a range of capabilities to the regional CINC unequaled by any other force. SOF supports the national strategy by providing expanded options for force employment, a strategic economy of force, and are rapidly adaptable to conditions allowing them to be tailored to any task.<sup>48</sup>

As it builds the future force, ARSOF must build upon the core values and competencies. With this firm foundation established, ARSOF must add to its capabilities those that are not present in the conventional force and those that enhance capabilities of conventional forces. Additionally, ARSOF should look to imbedding its range of functions, to include Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Operations Aviation into deployable packages. Designating forces to work together habitually, forward basing of selected elements, and

reorganizing unit structures are methods of implementing this option.

Building on the present structure and capability of the theater SOC is the most cost-effective means of implementing the REF concept. LTG Chelberg related his experience with SOC Europe (SOCEUR) by stating, "The closest thing to a standing JTF is our special operations component. It's already a joint organization, its personnel and training are first-class, and it has a great breadth of experience that makes it responsive and operationally agile. But it's just too small to respond to many of our likely contingencies, and it doesn't have enough excess capacity to become a standing JTF able to respond to all missions".<sup>49</sup> Instead of establishing an additional functional headquarters, SOF should look at an enlarged or Super SOC.<sup>50</sup> The SOC would be able to handle a large portion of the engagement activities as is does today and continue to maintain a balance with warfighting tasks. Relationships with conventional forces are developed routinely through exercises and training and lead to a smoother transition from peacetime to crisis response operations.

The task at all levels of the armed forces is to meet the challenges posed by an uncertain future. This is a difficult task at best as Joint Vision 2010 points out, "we will have to make hard choices to achieve the tradeoffs that will bring the

best balance, most capability, and greatest interoperability for the least cost." The REF concept is one model as an answer to how the military and ARSOF should address the present national strategy. This concept, as with others presented, will provide a basis for thorough analysis and thought. For as stated by GEN Shelton, then CINCUSOCOM, "As we look ahead, we should encourage lively, productive and intellectual debate to help us map our course, so that we can be sure we are on the right azimuth as we move into the future."<sup>51</sup>

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> James M. Dubik, "Sacred Cows Make Good Shoes: Changing the Way We Think About Military Force Structure," Landpower Essay Series, Nov 97-1, Feb 97. Institute of Land Warfare.p2.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. p6.

<sup>3</sup> A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998.

<sup>4</sup> Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997.

<sup>5</sup> The Army uses the acronym, DTLOMS, with the "S" standing for "Soldiers."

<sup>6</sup> SOF Vision 2020.

<sup>7</sup> Regional Engagement: An Army Special Operations Forces Approach to Future Theater Military Operations, Final Edited Draft 2 Sep 98 (w/6 Oct 98 changes), prepared by Research Planning Inc. for the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (UASJFKSWCS). A rewrite of this concept can be found in the Fall 1998 issue of Special Warfare magazine. The article is written by MG Bowra and COL Harris of USAJFKSWCS. Hereafter referred to as REF.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pg. iv.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pg. v.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pg. 21. These traits include: above average intelligence; language aptitude; acceptance of other cultures; tolerance of ambiguity; problem-solving skills; tolerance for austere living conditions; ability to function in groups or in isolation; emotional and mental stability; tolerance for stress; self-discipline; self-confidence; flexibility.

<sup>11</sup> President Bush Speech in Aspen, 2 August 1990, "Transforming the US Security Environment."

<sup>12</sup> Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, January 1991, pp. 6, 7.

<sup>13</sup> A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997, p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. pp. 8, 9.

<sup>15</sup> David Jablonsky, "The State of the National Security State." US National Security: Beyond the Cold War, Strategic Studies Institute, July 26, 1997, p. 28.

<sup>16</sup> The National Military Strategy, 1997, p. 7.

<sup>17</sup> "Defense Engagement in Peacetime". Reading assigned by DNSS, lesson 2-29. Updated from Strategic Assessment 1996, National Defense University, Institute for Strategic Affairs. Public Domain.

<sup>18</sup> 1998 Strategic Assessment, Engaging Power for Peace. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, pp. 21-22.

<sup>19</sup> "Defense Engagement in Peacetime". 1996 Strategic Assessment.

<sup>20</sup> Jablonsky, p. 36.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 1-1.

<sup>22</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.01C, JSCP FY98, 1 Jul 98, (TS).

<sup>23</sup> Strategic Concept for USCINCCENT Plan 1250 (U) Engagement for the Central Region Theater (U), USCENTCOM, Macdill AFB, FLA 33621-5101, 30ppg, 1 Oct 98. Hereafter referred to as TEP.

<sup>24</sup> TEP, pg 3.

<sup>25</sup> TEP, pg 4.

<sup>26</sup> TEP, pg 4.

<sup>27</sup> TEP, pg 19. Presently USCENTCOM is not participating in any peace operations. Sanctions enforcement includes activities directed toward Iraq and Pakistan. Force protection operations include security surveys and infrastructure upgrades of in-theater facilities.

<sup>28</sup> TEP, pgs. 22-24. USCENTCOM sponsors demining activities in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Jordan, and Yemen. UN has activities in Afghanistan. Future countries include Oman, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, and Iran. The list of engagement is not all inclusive and is provided to show the magnitude of the engagement effort.

<sup>29</sup> TEP, pg. 25.

<sup>30</sup> TEP, pg. 30.

<sup>31</sup> REF, pg. 6.

<sup>32</sup> REF, pgs. 8-11.

<sup>33</sup> REF, pg. 23. The Regional Engagement plan would be the CINCs TEP.

<sup>34</sup> REF, pg. 24. The C2 relationship between the REF and SOC is not clear. The REF command authority can extend to operations requiring up to a division level staff, implying a two-star command. The SOC as presently organized, is commanded by a brigadier general and thus would not normally maintain OPCON of the higher command.

<sup>35</sup> REF, pg. 29. ARSOF includes Special Forces (SF), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Civil Affairs (CA).

<sup>36</sup> REF, pg. 30.

<sup>37</sup> Robert D. Chelberg, LTG(R), Jack W. Ellertson, (COL), David H. Shelley, MAJ(USA), "At the Center of the Vortex", Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 93, pgs. 12-16.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., pg. 14.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pg. 15.

<sup>40</sup> AUSA, Army Budget FY98: An Analysis, Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Jul 97, pg. 3).

<sup>41</sup> Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, Secretary of Defense, pg. V.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. pg vii.

<sup>43</sup> The REF authors point out that the concept does not call for optimizing exclusively for engagement nor for a bifurcated force with one force to fight wars and another for operations other than war. It calls for a force structure optimized for a holistic approach to military operations recognizing the interdependence of operations across the continuum.

<sup>44</sup> Jeffrey Record, "The Creeping Irrelevance of US Force Planning", Manuscript prepared for the US Army War College 9<sup>th</sup> Annual Strategy Conference, Mar 31-Apr 2, 1998, Carlisle Barracks, PA., pg. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Dubik, pg. 10.

<sup>46</sup> Kim R. Kadesch, LTC, The Army After Next: On a Collision Course with Strategic Reality, US Army War College Strategic Research Project, 1998, pg. 10.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., pg. 9.

<sup>48</sup> Peter J. Schoomaker, Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead, 1998.

<sup>49</sup> Chelberg, pg. 14.

<sup>50</sup> Edward J. McHale, MAJ, USA, "Super SOCs and JSAFs: Building a Force for 2010", Special Warfare, December, 1996, pg.14.

<sup>51</sup> Henry H. Shelton, Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command, "Special Operations Forces: Looking Ahead", Special Warfare, Spring 1997, pg. 11.

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